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ABSTRACT
In this article, we aim at sharpening common understandings of the 
notion of political crisis to better explain the trajectories of authoritarian 
transformations during popular uprisings. We make three major claims. 
First, we propose a definition of crisis as brief moments of institutional 
fluidity and openness in which a process can take different directions. 
We delineate the crisis concept from the concept of critical junctures 
and outline how our approach contributes to the methodological 
debate on ‘near misses’. Second, we indicate how the de-institutionali-
sation processes leading up to a crisis are to be analytically distinguished 
from within-crisis moments. We argue in favour of a discontinuity 
approach that takes into account the different temporalities of gradual 
lead-up processes and rapid within-crisis dynamics. Finally, we illustrate 
our theoretical and analytical reasoning with concrete cases from the 
authoritarian crises of the Arab uprisings, whilst suggesting that our 
argument can travel to other areas of research in which crisis narratives 
have gained prominence.
1. Introduction
‘Crises’ seem to be among the most unreflectively deployed concepts in the social sciences. 
The understandings of what crises actually mean differ considerably. This is a predicament 
that is hardly new; some 20 years ago already Hay (1999, 317) complained that crisis ‘is one 
of the most underdeveloped concepts in state theory’. He ventured that the term’s ubiquity 
in the literature derived ‘precisely from this notorious imprecision’ (Hay 1999, 318). Crises 
can be of structural and long-lasting nature (eg Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975) or 
can be brief, tumultuous and fatal moments in time in which actors’ decisions become par-
amount (eg Linz 1978). Crises can also be either acute vs chronic, or manifest vs latent. A 
crisis can affect the whole functioning of a (political) system or might affect only some parts 
(Gerschewski 2018). At one end of the spectrum, we find the literature on state crisis and 
state failure and collapse that addresses the systemic breakdowns of state governance 
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(Beissinger and Young 2002; Eriksen 2011). At the other end, we have the literature dealing 
with political leadership during crisis episodes (Ansell, Boin and Hart 2014). Whilst the last 
few years have been dominated by the financial crisis and the (so-called) refugee crisis, there 
were also repeated suggestions that democracy itself was in crisis, at a time when various 
autocracies were clearly in crisis as well (eg during the 2011 Arab uprisings).
We do not aim to provide a final answer to the way the terminology of ‘crisis’ should or 
should not be used as we recognise that part of its attractiveness resides precisely in that it 
is a catch-all term, sometimes used as a place holder before a more precise account of the 
problem is provided. Instead, we build our argument on Hay’s (1999, 323–324) point that a 
more precise crisis terminology can be ‘based on the analytical distinction between failure 
(an accumulation or condensation of contradictions) and crisis (a moment of decisive inter-
vention during which these contradictions are identified)’. In this light, we suggest a specific 
conceptualisation of political crisis that can be usefully deployed in the literature on democ-
ratisation and authoritarianism. In particular, we make two important clarifications, to the 
concept of crisis and to the empirical analysis of crisis episodes.
First, we propose that we can sharpen the notion of crisis by delineating it from the 
neighbouring concept of critical juncture. We define a critical juncture as a probability raiser 
for change that is inherently biased towards ‘positive’ cases. The critical juncture framework 
has its major analytical strength in explaining institutional pathways after the juncture hap-
pens. In contrast, a crisis episode is a moment of fluidity and openness. The analytical strength 
of the concept of crisis is that it emphasises how contingency creates new political identities 
and dynamics at the early stages of what might develop later into a critical juncture. 
Methodologically, we argue that by sharpening the crisis concept we are better equipped 
to incorporate cases of ‘near misses’ or ‘negative outcomes’ – ie moments in which change 
was likely, but did not happen (Mahoney and Goertz 2004; Dunning 2017).
Second, we propose that a discontinuity approach constitutes the most useful way to 
organise the empirical study of crisis episodes. The discontinuity approach marks a clear 
difference between the lead-up to a crisis and the within-crisis dynamics. This approach 
underscores the analytical value of detaching the within-crisis situational logics from pre-
vious developments that led to this moment. Within the critical juncture literature, there is 
a debate regarding whether a crisis turns into a critical juncture due a preexisting causal 
dynamic or not (Slater and Simmons 2010; Dunning 2017). Here we explicitly argue that due 
to different temporalities, what leads to a crisis does not necessarily matter in a crisis. The 
lead-up to a crisis moment and the situational logics within a crisis should be systematically 
distinguished from each other. They can be integrated into one coherent framework of 
analysis, yet researchers should always account for potential discontinuities. In particular, 
we articulate how the production of new within-crisis identities and strategic choices can 
be distinguished from prior causal dynamics and how they can be included in the overall 
analysis of a crisis and its outcomes. To illustrate the pertinence of these theoretical and 
analytical perspectives, we revisit some of the recent political crises in contemporary author-
itarian regimes in the Middle East during the 2011 Arab uprisings.
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2. Crises vs critical junctures
A critical juncture can be described as a moment in which change is of heightened prob-
ability. The juncture is critical because it is more likely that a specific long-term institutional 
outcome (legacy) is produced (Collier and Collier 1991; Collier and Munck 2017). In one 
elegant definition, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 348) introduce critical junctures as ‘rel-
atively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability 
that agents’ choice will affect the outcome of interest’. They argue that the criticalness of 
a critical juncture can be measured by two components: its temporal leverage and its 
probability jump (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 360–363). Temporal leverage means that 
the episode is all the more critical the briefer it is compared to the resulting institutional 
outcome. The probability jump, in turn, refers to the idea that the more critical this episode 
is, the more it affects the probability that an institutional legacy is produced. In other 
words, a very critical ‘critical juncture’ would be one in which a short sequence of events 
produces a long-lasting institutional outcome that had a very low probability of happening 
at the start of the sequence. A critical juncture is thus understood as an incubator 
of change.
Soifer (2012) proposed a notion of critical juncture that went beyond the idea of Capoccia 
and Kelemen. He introduced a ‘causal logic of critical junctures’ (Soifer 2012, 1572). This 
causal logic lies in the separation between permissive conditions that allow for a loosening 
of structural constraints, and productive conditions that act within the boundaries of the 
opened possibility space and produce the outcome. He argues that a critical juncture is 
characterised by the presence of permissive conditions and the presence of productive 
conditions (Soifer 2012, 1580). It is a moment in which change is very likely due to the 
presence of both the opportunity and the push for change. Here, it becomes even more 
evident that the study of critical junctures has an inherent bias towards ‘positive cases’ 
(Dunning 2017).
Importantly, however, the literature on critical junctures retains a degree of ambiguity 
when it comes to qualifying ‘near misses’. Collier and Munck (2017, 6) insist that a critical 
juncture needs to produce a legacy, which is ‘an enduring, self-perpetuating institutional 
inheritance of the critical juncture that persists and is stable for a substantial period. If a 
legacy in this sense does not emerge, then the prior episode is not considered a critical 
juncture’. In a similar vein, Slater and Simmons (2010, 888) define critical junctures as ‘periods 
in history when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases 
onto divergent long-term pathways, or pushes a single case onto a new political trajectory 
that diverges significantly from the old’. They further demarcate critical junctures from other 
types of transformations by stressing the importance of what they call ‘critical antecedents’, 
which are ‘factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture that combine with causal forces 
during a critical juncture to produce long-term divergence in outcomes’ (Slater and Simmons 
2010, 889).
Other scholars, by contrast, seek to include different types of ‘near misses’. As Capoccia 
and Kelemen (2007, 352) explicitly note: ‘contingency implies that wide-ranging change is 
possible and even likely but also that re-equilibration is not excluded’. In their view, ‘change 
is not a necessary element of a critical juncture’. Bernhard (2015) adds that a critical juncture 
might not always produce a stable legacy, but that it can result in ‘chronic instability’ and 
the rapid succession of regimes. From this perspective, instability, despite its lack of specific 
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institutional content, constitutes a type of legacy that makes the preceding episode qualify 
as a possible critical juncture.
These differences underscore a significant conceptual disagreement regarding when it 
is appropriate to analyse specific episodes of change as critical junctures. In effect, despite 
important works on the gradual and endogenous developments that lead to a critical junc-
ture (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen and Mahoney 2010), the bulk of the literature analyses 
cases that produce specific legacies. The majority of recent scholarly works are more inter-
ested in the legacy effect of critical junctures and the creation of path-dependent develop-
ments than in ‘near misses’. As a result, the literature tends to overemphasise positive cases 
and does not problematise identifying ‘near misses’.
In this light, we argue that our approach to crisis is well suited to address these ‘near 
misses’. We follow in the footsteps of Mahoney and Goertz (2004) regarding the ‘possibility 
principle’. We agree with these scholars that the identification of negative cases is crucial 
and consequential for theory building and testing, but is often not as straightforward as one 
might assume. Negative cases are cases for which an event was possible, but the expected 
outcome did not materialise. The critical junctures literature, with its emphasis on path-de-
pendent processes producing legacies, commonly adopts a forward-looking explanatory 
approach that starts from a well-defined episode. Certainly, all investigations of critical junc-
tures involve some reflection on preconditions. Illuminating studies like the one by Collier 
and Collier (1991) on labour movements in Latin America, or the study of Mahoney (2001) 
on the legacies of liberalism, include antecedent conditions that define the range of historical 
options available to the actors. Nevertheless, the main point of the critical juncture approach 
(at least from the perspective of the empirical scholars) is to understand what follows from 
such watershed moments and how legacies crystallise.
In contrast, crisis is a concept that is less directional and more attuned to the uncertainty 
and fluidity of a particular episode. Crisis does not include an in-built quest for significant 
legacies and is therefore more attuned to explaining why and how these episodes occur in 
the first place. In our understanding, a crisis is a precondition for the possibility of change. 
In other words, there are crises that do not produce critical junctures, but there are no critical 
junctures without prior crises. A crisis is necessary but not sufficient for a critical juncture. 
This has important consequences for capturing the re-equilibration processes taking places 
in ‘near-miss’ cases. When the focus is primarily on events that have a lasting legacy, then 
we over-value the mechanisms found in ‘successful’ critical junctures and under-value those 
found in episodes where change was likely, but the situation reverted to the situation ex 
ante. By and large, ‘near misses’ are characterised by what they lack to become actual critical 
junctures with a lasting legacy.
The analytical focus on crisis enables us to highlight the specific temporality of these 
episodes, and particularly the acceleration of the tempo of change, as described by Grzymala-
Busse (2011). This acceleration of tempo and the contingencies associated with it increase 
the relevance of situational logics for the strategies of the actors. In this context, as outlined 
by Kurzman (2004) and Ermakoff (2015) in different revolutionary situations, confusion and 
mutual uncertainty become important factors of change. Whilst these dynamics, and the 
actors and strategies creating them, may be transient, accounting for these factors helps 
refine the analysis of the trajectories of crises and their eventual institutional legacies (from 
state collapse to democratic consolidation).
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3. Crisis in authoritarian regimes: lead-up vs within-crisis dynamics
As an empirical illustration, we use crises in authoritarian regimes. We follow the broad 
definition of authoritarian regimes by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). They identify three 
ways by which an authoritarian regime starts to exist: undemocratic elections; democratic 
elections but a subsequent change in formal and informal rules that inhibits competition; 
and competitive elections, but the military preventing parties from competing. Our argu-
ment does not directly engage with the debates concerning the different types of authori-
tarian rule, though we realise that our approach could be refined by studies analysing specific 
sub-categories of authoritarianism.
We deliberately use authoritarian systems in order to bring into sharp focus the issue of 
political crises in regimes with less reliable institutionalised mechanisms of de-escalation. 
We agree with the recent institutionalist literature that highlights how autocratic regimes 
can also rely on party structures, parliaments, judiciaries and elections, but also informal 
rules, to maintain their rule (Magaloni 2006; Brownlee 2007; Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008; 
Schedler 2013; Morgenbesser 2016). However, we stress that whilst authoritarian regimes 
use court rulings, snap elections, ‘independent’ investigations and executive concessions in 
order to de-escalate tensions, they do not have dependable political mechanisms to address 
the challenge of mass protests directed at the incumbent elites. Whereas in democratic 
systems elections provide an institutionalised mechanism to diffuse popular discontent by 
rotating the elites, holding elections in authoritarian regimes (including those with non-com-
petitive elections) in response to a crisis usually heightens the extraordinary character of 
the crisis more than it de-escalates tensions. At the time of writing, a vivid illustration of this 
situation is the wave of mobilisation sweeping Algeria against the holding of elections organ-
ised by the regime (Grewal, Kilavuz, and Kubinec 2019).
Phenomenologically, we focus here on one type of authoritarian crisis that displays three 
main characteristics: (1) an explicit public challenge to the regime (eg in the form of street 
protests), (2) a sustained level of mobilisation that disrupts routine authoritarian governance 
(eg police or army mobilisation, partial shutdown of institutions), and (3) the emergence 
of explicit intra-elite challenges (eg a split between soft- and hardliners).
Typically, these crises are the results of two main processes of de-institutionalisation: 
gradual and rapid. While the first one is stretched over a longer period of time and 
accounts for incremental change that leads to a crisis situation, the latter takes into 
account fast and unexpected shifts that disrupt governance routines in a short period of 
time. These disruptions are identifiable in terms of both formal de-institutionalisation 
(eg imposition of martial law, suspension of the constitution, of habeas corpus, etc.) and 
de facto de-institutionalisation (eg branches of the state administration not having the 
means or the personnel required to function beyond minimal capacity or outside specific 
locations).
3.1. Gradual de-institutionalisation and lead-up to crisis
Consider the following citation by Brownlee:
The collapse of a dictatorship seems a sign of the supremacy of the human will. Jubilant masses 
flood the streets, statues fell, and parliaments reawaken with new faces. At that moment, the 
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‘inhuman’ forces of social structure and political organization appear peripheral the action at 
best. Yet, in another sense, the victory of dissidents and activists is but the final act of a long 
drama. (Brownlee 2007, 17–18)
To analyse the ‘long drama’ is to address the underlying, slowly moving factors that shape 
the lead-up to the crisis moment. In this perspective, the analysis must consider cumulative 
causes in which a slow but steady change in one condition is observed over time and leads 
gradually to a crisis. The incremental change can either be observed from the very beginning 
or take place for a significant period of time under the radar, ie without observers noting it 
at first until it leads ultimately to a big ‘blow’ (Pierson 2003). In addition, these cumulative 
causes can present themselves also as a chain of interrelated phenomena in which change 
in one condition triggers a sequence of (prospectively) unexpected events. While the first 
process corresponds phenomenologically to the evolution of one set of conditions 
A→A→A→Y, the other entails a sequence of distinct phenomena A→B→C→Y. What both 
have in common is a prolonged time frame in which these sequences unfold.
A prominent macro-structural example of the structural cascade pathway (A→B→C→Y) 
is the path-dependent explanation of regime outcomes in Central America by Mahoney 
(2001). It explains the differing regime outcomes of military authoritarianism, traditional-dic-
tatorial regimes, and democratic polities. Mahoney’s explanatory model of antecedent con-
ditions, critical junctures, and reactive sequences is of course much more elaborated than 
the structural cascade pathway that we propose here. But what is important for our argument 
is that Mahoney builds his influential account on distinct and sequential phases of a devel-
opment towards a regime outcome. Each stage programmatically and explicitly sets the 
parameters for the next one.
This structural cascade contrasts with the mounting up of one set of (observed or unseen) 
conditions (A→A→A→Y) leading to a crisis. A well-known illustration is that of mounting 
economic difficulties leading to a major political crisis. In the 1980s, there was a wave of 
crises in developing countries induced by the rolling out of structural adjustment plans 
devised by the International Monetary Fund (Walton and Seddon 1994; Sadiki 2000). In those 
cases, a progressive worsening of socio-economic conditions for a large part of the popu-
lation caused by the rolling back of welfare provisions led to widespread social unrest during 
so-called ‘food riots’.
These gradual developments are usually time-consuming and extend over a longer period 
of time. They form the underlying, slow-moving causes and represent the lead-up to a crisis 
moment. Their temporalities differ in most cases from within-crisis dynamics in three fun-
damental ways: their duration is long, their tempo slow and their acceleration low.
3.2. Rapid de-institutionalisation and within-crisis dynamics
The second process is a rapid process of deinstitutionalisation triggered by the actions of 
professional or amateur political entrepreneurs. As such, it is more an actor-driven process 
that usually takes place in a short time span and that leads to a disruption of governance 
routines. In generic terms, these dynamics have their roots often in a cognitive disequilibrium 
between the objectives of the actors and their achievements (Aoki 2001). In authoritarian 
systems, more specifically, they are also often an outcome of the dynamics of expressing 
preferences publicly – ie when preference falsification (Kuran 1995) is overcome. From this 
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perspective, the positionality of the actors deciding when ‘enough is enough’ or when there 
is an opening for them to safely express dissent in large numbers is key to suddenly upsetting 
institutionalised mechanisms of authoritarian governance.
Empirically, rapid de-institutionalisation processes can be illustrated by the wave of ‘colour 
revolutions’ of the 2000s. Elections that were planned by regimes as a means to prolong the 
authoritarian status quo backfired. They produced a situation of heightened delegitimisation 
and strengthened the political opposition. The electoral debacle in turn created the condition 
for an open post-electoral challenge by a reorganised opposition movement (Bunce and 
Wolchik 2010). Extra-constitutional post-electoral mobilisation produced in many cases a 
rapid change of regime. In this context, electoral mismanagement highlighted how actors’ 
miscalculation, overreaction and/or improvisation constituted short-term causes for a rapid 
de-institutionalisation process. The dynamics of the Arab uprisings that we illustrate in the 
next section provide more insights into how within-crisis dynamics produce specific pro-
cesses of rapid de-institutionalisation of authoritarian regimes. Before we do so, we highlight 
the main tenets of our methodological suggestion of a discontinuity approach. It emphasises 
the distinct nature of long-term lead-up to crises on the one hand and situational logics 
within crisis dynamics on the other hand.
3.3. The discontinuity approach
We propose a discontinuity approach that explicitly distinguishes between the lead-up to 
the crisis that is usually connected to gradual deinstitutionalisation processes and with-
in-crisis dynamics that are usually connected to rapid deinstitutionalisation processes. 
Grzymala-Busse’s (2011) perceptive analysis of the role of temporality draws special atten-
tion to the importance of disentangling them from each other. Due to their different tem-
poralities with respect to duration, tempo and acceleration, we argue that what is important 
for the emergence of a crisis does not necessarily matter for what happens in the crisis itself.
Dobry (2009) explains the articulation of situational logics onto prior causal mechanisms 
by analogy with Clausewitz’s argument about war being the continuation of politics. He 
notes that although war ‘emerges out of the very diverse political ends or aims pursued by 
states or their governments’, once it breaks out something new becomes noticeable: 
‘because of the situational logic that engulfs its protagonists, war tends to develop logics 
of its own, independent from its original political end, cause or determinant’ (Dobry 
2009, 79).
In our argument, we make a similar point regarding political crises. While the emergence 
of these crises may be understood as an outcome of specific combinations of local, national 
and international factors and strategies, once there is a crisis situation, new factors and 
strategies generated by the crisis itself gain prominence. Importantly, we emphasise that 
we cannot assume that ‘within-crisis’ dynamics only matter when we have deviant outcomes, 
and that they are irrelevant when the crisis outcomes are in line with structural trends. 
Tracking how institutions fail (and are then rebuilt) enables the identification of false positive 
cases – ie cases in which post-crisis institutional outcomes align themselves with the pre-
dicted evolution of a particular regime but not due to the reasons posited in structural 
models. As Kurzman (2004b) illustrated in the case of the 1979 Iranian revolution, analysing 
rapid sequences of de-institutionalisation not only provides insights into how unexpected 
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outcomes come about, but also highlights the causal pertinence or irrelevance of structural 
factors for strategic choices.
Methodologically, the discontinuity approach asks us to first place ourselves at the begin-
ning of the lead-up to a crisis and to observe empirically the factors behind its unfolding. 
Secondly, we should place ourselves anew at the beginning of the crisis itself in order to 
evaluate specifically within-crisis dynamics. This second step is crucial to identify the views, 
actions and strategies of old and newly emerging protagonists as they are expressed at the 
time (and not as they might be second-guessed by an external observer (Kurzman 2004b; 
Ermakoff 2015)). This discontinuity approach does not mean that causes prior to and in crises 
necessarily diverge. However, this approach ensures that explanations of what happened 
in a crisis do not fall into either the extrapolation trap or the post hoc rationalisation trap. 
Below, we illustrate our reasoning with empirical case studies. We focus on the 2011 Arab 
uprisings in which specific within-crisis dynamics reinforced or disrupted the trajectories of 
de-institutionalisation of the authoritarian regimes of the Middle East and North Africa.
4. Structural trends and strategic choices during crisis: the case of the  
Arab uprisings
During the 2011 Arab uprisings, the sequence of mobilisation that occurred in Tunisia 
between 17 December 2010, when Bouazizi set himself on fire, and 14 January 2011, when 
President Ben Ali fled the country, illustrated well in-crisis dynamics. While the factors that 
led to the crisis – economic failure, suppression of dissenting voices, etc. – provided grounds 
for people to revolt, it remains controversial how far they directly shaped the way the protest 
unfolded and the resulting institutional reconfigurations (Gana 2013). While the established 
pro- and anti-regime actors were actively implementing their preferred strategies, they were 
repeatedly unable to control the protests or cope with the (intended and unintended) con-
sequences of protest interactions. Instead, a leaderless protest movement began to set the 
tempo and sequence of political change in the polity (Volpi 2017).
It was a leaderless (or leader-full) movement in the sense that important events and 
processes were repeatedly triggered in an ad hoc way by groups and individuals who were 
not previously significant actors in the Tunisian political landscape. Whereas the routine 
governance of discontent in the country and the previous management of crises set the 
parameters for managing known protest actors (Camau and Geisser 2003; Chouikha and 
Geisser 2010), the 2011 uprisings gained additional momentum by involving new categories 
of actors and practices. As we indicated in our theoretical outline, the lead-up to the crisis 
was important for the emergence of the protest movement, but it did not determine the 
type of actors who would direct the movement or the modalities of contestation, which 
were the results of within-crisis dynamics.
Situational logics are crucial here because new actors of change are guided more by 
achieving (often confusedly conceived) local, short-term objectives than nationwide or pro-
grammatic institutional transformations. Allal (2011) provided a vivid description of how 
young Tunisia ‘revolutionaries’ seized the opportunities created by mass unrest to reorganise 
local politics and economic activities to their advantage in their suburbs and to become the 
new ‘security’ providers. Tellingly, whereas organised activists and institutional actors may 
have had grand projects of reform, in the public sphere talks of a ‘revolution’ and of ‘regime 
change’ only became noticeable after several weeks of popular protests (Volpi 2017). Initially, 
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it is a sum of uncoordinated collective endeavours – each one a reflection of particular local 
circumstances and interactions – that directly shaped the options for governance at the 
national level at that moment (Mekouar 2017). The flight of President Ben Ali is illustrative 
of an institutional transformation triggered by the situational logics of unrest in Tunis. When 
protests came too close to the seat of power and Ben Ali began to have doubts about the 
willingness and/or ability of the security forces to guarantee his safety, he decided to leave 
the country and in so doing deepened and accelerated the process of deinstitutionalisation 
of the regime (Jebnoun 2014; Volpi 2017).
The strategic choices of the president during the Tunisian uprising underscore the ten-
sion between situational logics and longer term strategies in times of crisis. Situational 
logics engulf elites as much as other actors. For newly mobilised grassroots protesters or 
previously depoliticised actors, the situational logics of crisis provide grounds for discarding 
earlier strategies of quiescence to routine authoritarian governance (El Chazli 2018; 
Pearlman 2018). For elites, in-crisis situational logics could also supersede established strat-
egies of governance and repression (Goodwin 2011; Jebnoun 2014). Some of their choices 
reflected the longer term evolution of the power balance between different factions of the 
ruling elites – typically soft- vs hardliners – in which case the crisis merely provided an 
opportunity to implement established strategies of institutional takeover. Other choices, 
by contrast, did not appear to fit well within pre-existing trends and were instead primarily 
an ad hoc product of the crisis itself (eg the flight of Ben Ali to Tunisia or, in a different 
register, the decision of the Algerian regime not to use lethal force to repress the uprising 
in the country; Volpi 2013). As we discussed in our theoretical introduction, those strategic 
choices that are shaped more by the tempo and acceleration of a crisis than by an evaluation 
of longer term costs and benefits are both an outcome and a cause of within-crisis dynamics.
The role of the military during crises is illustrative of the tension between these logics 
and temporalities of change. Empirically, the 2011 Arab uprisings presented the estab-
lished scholarship with a number of difficulties as a series of supposedly strong security 
apparatuses and regimes were forced to revise their strategic and tactical aims in the face 
of mass protests (Bellin 2012). In this context, to note the congruence of the military elite’s 
preferences before and after the crisis in order to highlight a posteriori the coherence of 
their strategies is not entirely satisfactory. It certainly helps to make sense of some of the 
changes that occurred but it does not demonstrate that these choices were made and 
these strategies were implemented. In this situation, Goodwin (2011, 454) thus sum-
marised the institutionalist rational-choice perspective: ‘the more professional and insti-
tutionalized armies in Tunisia and Egypt calculated that they could best safeguard their 
interests by abandoning dictators’. But querying how far this estimate could have been 
given at the time of the uprisings, he concluded that ‘the structural characteristics and 
dispositions of armies often become apparent only after they begin to fight for their 
survival’.
During the uprising, protesters actively sought to entice the security forces deployed on 
the street to join them, with various levels of success (Ketchley 2014; Mekouar 2017), and in 
so doing they introduced a specific in-crisis factor that weighed upon the decisions of the 
military leadership. While the issue of the institutional cohesion of the military is a long-term 
concern of any armed forces, specific within-crisis circumstances requiring a shift from tar-
geted covert coercion to open mass repression not only changes the strategic calculations 
of existing ‘security’ forces (as in Egypt or Tunisia), but can also create new armed actors and 
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strategies (as in Libya and Syria). In our argument, we draw attention to the variations in the 
institutional trajectories of regimes that are introduced by the situational logics of the crisis. 
In particular, we stress that we cannot mechanically extrapolate the factors that mattered 
prior to crisis to the crisis itself.
This last observation acts as a counterweight to the structural analyses of contemporary 
political crises that tend to offset contingency-generated strategic choices by invoking long-
term calculations and institutional reequilibration. For Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 
(2015, 62), protesters during the 2011 Arab uprisings ‘may have perceived a structural oppor-
tunity where one did not exist’, and their mobilisation succeeded ‘partly because of a misper-
ception that regimes were vulnerable’. In their explanation, the dynamics of within-crisis 
agency are stripped of most of their rationale, and the relevant causal dynamics are named 
a posteriori in view of measurable institutional outcomes. As a result, the only possible 
outcomes of these crises were the ones we obtained, and within-crisis agency had a causal 
impact only insofar as it purposely or inadvertently facilitated pre-existing trends.
In relation to earlier revolutionary episodes in Southeast Asia, Slater (2009, 206) con-
structed a similar argument when he noted that ‘unless we do the historical work to uncover 
where oppositional political cultures come from, it is difficult, if not impossible, to explain 
why so many societies have produced neither democratic revolutions nor large-scale author-
itarian crackdowns but persistent quiescence’. In this context, Slater limits the relevant with-
in-crisis strategies to the ones that articulate themselves onto longer term nationalist and 
religious repertoires of established communal elites. While we do not discount these factors 
out of hand and acknowledge their particular importance for comparative work (Møller 
2013), the study of within-crisis dynamics is about creating a space for analysing the sui 
generi causal impact of new actors and strategies.
Capoccia and Ziblatt (2010) noted that during a critical juncture there are multiple pos-
sible scenarios which are equally plausible, and only process tracing can show how one set 
of outcomes came into being. Methodically, we stress the relevance of their argument about 
episode analysis. We strongly concur with their point that we should ‘go back and see’. 
However, we also stress that to do so effectively, the institutionalist analysis has to prob-
lematise more systematically the creation of new actors, and not have as its default position 
that the actor’s identity is somewhat known. We focus here on those identity markers that 
are shaped by institutions (which facilitate or constrain specific views and practices) and 
that are therefore tied to institutional capacity and effectiveness (North 1990; Clemens and 
Cook 1999). This known identity of the actors is implicit in Capoccia and Kelemen’s (2007, 
354–355) argument when they state that episode analysis should reconstruct each step of 
the decision-making process, discuss the availability and viability of options in the eyes of 
the actors, and uncover the relation to and effect on other decisions.
unlike in the social movement literature (Jasper and Volpi 2018), from an institutionalist 
perspective, less attention is paid to how new actors become relevant actors – a tendency 
that is compensated by a greater focus on the novel decisions taken by known actors in 
new circumstances. Ahmed and Capoccia (2014) illustrate this point in their analysis of 
the 2011 Arab uprisings in Egypt. The focus of their explanation is on the crucial role played 
by an established Islamist organisation (Muslim Brotherhood) and workers’ unions. Yet 
other cases during the Arab uprisings provide clear examples of how the causal impact 
of newly created actors shaped specific trajectories of crisis. As we outlined in our theo-
retical presentation, within-crisis dynamics are producing not only new factors and 
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strategies that were not entirely identifiable in the lead-up to the crisis, but also new actors’ 
identities.
A powerful illustration of these crisis-generated identities is the role played by some of 
the revolutionary brigades during the Libyan uprising. Whereas Libya may now be turning 
into a model of chronic instability, many of the actors responsible for this situation were not 
present (as political actors) before the uprising. Not only were they not present as structured 
organisations, but pre-existing cleavages within Libyan society did not indicate that such 
entities were about to emerge at this juncture. The formation of armed movements was 
easily conceivable along tribal, ethnic or religious lines (Anderson 1986); but the within-crisis 
contingency of the uprising opened up new opportunities for city-framed identities to 
emerge without clear antecedents. The rise to prominence of the armed brigades of the 
town of Misrata during 2011 shows how new collective actors emerged and became key 
players of the Libyan crisis as a result of the conflict itself (Lacher 2011; McQuinn 2015). A 
strong local identity that challenged and remodeled previous affiliations was created in a 
previously unremarkable part of the country directly as a result of the siege of the city by 
Gaddafi’s forces. At least in part due to the NATO military intervention at that time, the 
strategies of these actors that asserted their newly created identity and newly defined inter-
ests became a crucial factor in locking in the institutional trajectories of instability that 
became entrenched in the country. One of the major merits of the discontinuity approach 
is to facilitate the analysis of such new players who are the product of situational logics and 
within-crisis dynamics.
Most of the crises of the Arab uprisings did not generate sufficient de-institutionalisation 
to produce new identities that could supersede pre-established identities and protest prac-
tices. Commonly, as could be seen in Jordan (Schwedler 2018), within-crisis dynamics gained 
momentum as different opposition actors jumped on the protest bandwagon and mobilised 
their supporters. Yet this momentum quickly fell as the regime negotiated with these differ-
ent groups to ensure that their mobilisation remained within existing repertoires of conten-
tion. As these protest dynamics did not underpin novel political subjectivities, the regime 
was able to tolerate these expressions of dissent. Nonetheless, even in these contexts, the 
notion of crisis is useful to analyse how contingency works to create new political dynamics 
in the early stages of a potential critical juncture. Before having a situation of increasing 
returns which makes specific identities and strategies the recognisable drivers of institutional 
reconfiguration (Pierson 2003), we have a period of indeterminacy when new contingent 
identities and practices that are only loosely connected to pre-existing cleavages in society 
are able to emerge.
The focus on within-crisis processes enables us to bring to light those causal factors and 
actors having a transient but decisive impact on the institutional trajectory of regimes. 
Identifying the role of those protagonists coming together as politically relevant collective 
actors during a crisis is an important first step to explaining changes in the strategy of estab-
lished actors. As Dobry (2009) stresses, another part of this inquiry is to investigate how some 
identities are less likely to reconfigure themselves even as social and political fluidity increase, 
thereby empowering entrenched actors and practices. Just as the institutional constraints 
on identity are never so strict that the actors cannot evade them (Thelen and Mahoney 2010), 
within-crisis fluidity is never so absolute that institutional factors are totally irrelevant. Thus, 
alongside identifying how novel actors and strategies are the product of crises, recognising 
how institutional influence can remain effective in situations of deinstitutionalisation is part 
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of the equation. These two dynamics help to better explain the direction of change at specific 
within-crisis junctures. They may also have a longer term impact on the trajectories of insti-
tutional change and the successes and failures of institutional legacies.
5. Conclusion
In this article, our analysis highlighted the difference between critical junctures and crises. 
Substantively, whereas crises are moments of heightened political fluidity and uncertainty, 
critical junctures are biased towards ‘positive cases’ and long-lasting legacies. In turn, the 
concept of crises represents a more open-ended set of political events. Analytically, the study 
of crisis is more focused on explaining the causal dynamics present at this specific moment; 
it is therefore better able to capture near misses and negative outcomes.
We argue that changes in causal interactions within a crisis can be mapped in the same 
way as we map the dynamics leading up to crisis. The crisis dynamics are linked to the longer 
term evolution of the factors stabilising (and destabilising) an authoritarian regime, but are 
distinct from them. In a structural logic, crises result from an accumulation of small changes 
either in one causal factor (mounting pressure) or in a sequence of interlocking factors 
(cascade). Whereas crises are articulated on those predictable factors (and actors), they are 
also shaped by rapid processes of de-institutionalisation set in motion by the more ad hoc 
strategic choices of the protagonists who purposely or unintendedly disrupt routine author-
itarian governance.
For within-crisis dynamics, we present the contingencies created by the crisis itself as a 
distinct causal factor. Here, far from being the outcome, the crisis becomes the cause of 
change. As the pace and tempo of change increase (Grzymala-Busse 2011), the crisis gen-
erates confusion (Kurzman 2004) and mutual uncertainty (Ermakoff 2015) which shape 
decisively the strategic choices of the protagonists. Within-crisis dynamics can therefore be 
quite distinct from the interactions that led to the crisis (and, by extension, from those fol-
lowing the crisis). We stress the need to avoid extrapolating the relevance of causal factors 
that were important before a crisis to the crisis itself. Only an in-depth examination of crisis 
episodes can establish how far earlier factors continue to be relevant and how far they are 
superseded by within-crisis dynamics. Importantly, this demands a more systematic inclusion 
of new identities and the strategies generated by the crisis itself.
The discontinuity approach that we outline summarises these methodological consider-
ations that ought to be part of a comprehensive explanation of crises. It emphasises that 
during crises, causal interactions need to be re-examined and re-weighted to reflect situa-
tional logics, and the outcomes need to be also explained in relation to these dynamics. A 
discontinuity explanation grounded in process tracing thus includes both the strategic 
choices corresponding to the longer term considerations of the protagonists, and the choices 
generated by the situational logics of the crisis. While longer term strategic choices and 
causal interactions can be approximated more readily by structural accounts focusing on 
the outcomes of a crisis, a discontinuity approach constitutes a crucial step in integrating 
within-crisis causal processes into a comprehensive explanation of institutional change.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
THIRD WORLD QuARTERLY 13
Notes on Contributors
Frédéric Volpi is a Professor and Chair in the Politics of the Muslim World in the Department of 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the university of Edinburgh. He is also the Director of the 
Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre for the Study of Contemporary Islam at the university of Edinburgh. 
He taught and researched at several leading uK universities, and in Sciences Po, Paris. He is the 
author of Political Islam Observed (Oxford university Press uSA/Hurst, 2010) and most recently of 
Revolution and Authoritarianism in North Africa (Oxford university Press uSA/Hurst, 2017). His arti-
cles have appeared in the Journal of Democracy, Middle East Journal, Democratization, Mediterranean 
Politics and Third World Quarterly, amongst others. His work broadly engages questions of authori-
tarianism and democratisation, as well as Islamism and social mobilisation, in the Middle East and 
North Africa.
Johannes Gerschewski is a Research Fellow at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center and the Academic 
Coordinator of the Theory Network at the Berlin-based Cluster of Excellence ‘Contestations of the 
Liberal Script (SCRIPTS)’. He received his PhD from Humboldt-universität zu Berlin in 2014. He was 
awarded the Gero Erdmann Prize for best dissertation and the ‘Frank Cass Award for Best Article by a 
Young Scholar’ from the journal Democratization. His articles have appeared in Perspectives on Politics, 
Comparative Political Studies, Democratization, Government and Opposition and Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift. His research interests lie in comparative democratisation, and democratic as well 
as autocratic theory, with a particular focus on questions of regime legitimation and research 
methodology.
Bibliography
Ahmed, Amel, and Giovanni Capoccia. “The Study of Democratization and the Arab Spring.” Middle 
East Law and Governance 6, no. 1 (2014): 1–31. doi:10.1163/18763375-00601002.
Allal, Amin. “Avant on tenait le mur, maintenant on tient le quartier! : Germes d’un passage au poli-
tique de jeunes hommes de quartiers populaires lors du moment révolutionnaire à Tunis.” Politique 
Africaine 121, no. 1 (2011): 53–67. doi:10.3917/polaf.121.0053.
Anderson, Lisa. The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980. Princeton: 
Princeton university Press, 1986. doi:10.1086/ahr/92.5.1245-a.
Ansell, Chris, Arjen Boin, and Paul ‘t Hart. ‘Political Leadership in Times of Crisis’. In The Oxford Handbook 
of Political Leadership, edited by R. A. W. Rhodes and Paul ‘t Hart, 419–435. Oxford: Oxford university 
Press, 2014.
Aoki, Masahiko. Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001.
Beissinger, Mark, and M. Crawford Young. Beyond State Crisis? Post-Colonial Africa and Post-Soviet 
Eurasia in Comparative Perspective. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002.
Bellin, Eva R. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism Reconsidered: Lessons of the Arab Spring.” 
Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 127–149. doi:10.5129/001041512798838021.
Bernhard, Michael. “Chronic Instability and the Limits of Path Dependence.” Perspectives on Politics 13, 
no. 4 (2015): 976–991. doi:10.1017/S1537592715002261.
Brownlee, Jason. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 2007.
Brownlee, Jason, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and 
Reform. Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2015.
Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. “Defeating Dictators. Electoral Change and Stability in 
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 43–86. doi:10.1017/
S0043887109990207.
Camau, Michel, and V. Geisser. Le syndrome autoritaire: politique en Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali. Paris: 
Presses de Sciences Po, 2003.
Capoccia, Giovanni, and R. Daniel Kelemen. “The Study of Critical Junctures Theory, Narrative, and 
Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism.” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007): 341–369. doi:10.1017/
S0043887100020852.
14 F. VOLPI AND J. GERSCHEWSKI
Capoccia, Giovanni, and Daniel Ziblatt. “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New 
Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond.” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 8–9 (2010): 931–968. 
doi:10.1177/0010414010370431.
Chouikha, Larbi, and Vincent Geisser. “Retour Sur la Révolte du Bassin Minier: Les Cinq Leçons 
Politiques D’un Conflit Social Inédit.” L’Année du Maghreb VI, (2010): 415–426. doi:10.4000/
anneemaghreb.923.
Clemens, Elisabeth S., and James M. Cook. “Politics and Institutionalisms. Explaining Durability and 
Change.” Annual Review of Sociology 25, no. 1 (1999): 441–466. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.441.
Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena. Critical Junctures, the Labor 
Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton university Press.
Collier, David, and Gerardo L. Munck. “Building Blocks and Methodological Challenges: A Framework 
for Studying Critical Junctures.” Qualitative & Multi-Method Research 15, no. 1 (2017): 2–9.
Crozier, Michael, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the 
Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission. New York: New York university Press.
Dobry, Michel. “Critical Processes and Political Fluidity: A Theoretical Appraisal.” International Political 
Anthropology 2, no. 1 (2009): 74–90.
Dunning, Thad. “Contingency and Determinism in Research on Critical Junctures: Avoiding the 
“Inevitability Framework.” Qualitative & Multi-Method Research 15, no. 1 (2017): 41–47.
El Chazli, Youssef. 2018. ‘It Takes Two (or More) to Tango: The Local Coproduction of the Alexandrian 
Revolutionary Moment’. In Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings: Mapping Interactions between 
Regimes and Protesters, edited by Volpi, Frédéric and James M. Jasper, 135–157. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam university Press.
Eriksen, Stein Sundstøl. “State Failure’ in Theory and Practice: The Idea of the State and the 
Contradictions of State Formation.” Review of International Studies 37, no. 1 (2011): 229–247. 
doi:10.1017/S0260210510000409.
Ermakoff, Ivan. “The Structure of Contingency.” American Journal of Sociology 121, no. 1 (2015): 64–125. 
doi:10.1086/682026.
Gana, Nouri, ed. The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh university Press, 2013.
Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A 
New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics 12, no. 2 (2014): 313–331. doi:10.1017/S1537592714000851.
Gerschewski, Johannes. ‘Analysing Crisis in Autocratic Regimes’ In: Crisis in Autocratic Regimes, edited 
by Gerschewski, Johannes and Christoph H. Stefes, 1–20. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2018.
Ginsburg, Tom, and Tamir Moustafa, eds. Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes. 
New York: Cambridge university Press, 2008.
Goodwin, Jeff. “Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring.” Swiss Political Science Review 17, 
no. 4 (2011): 452–456. doi:10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02045.x.
Grewal, Sharan M., Tahir Kilavuz, and Robert Kubinec. Algeria’s uprising: A Survey of Protesters and 
the Military, Brookings Institute Foreign Policy Paper, July 2019.
Grzymala-Busse, Anna. “Time Will Tell? Temporality and the Analysis of Causal Mechanisms 
and Processes.” Comparative Political Studies 44, no. 9 (2011): 1267–1297. doi:10.1177/ 
0010414010390653.
Hay, Collin. “Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the Process of 
Change.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 1, no. 3 (1999): 317–344. 
doi:10.1111/1467-856X.00018.
Jasper, James M., and Frédéric Volpi. ‘Rethinking mobilization after the Arab uprisings’, In 
Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings: Mapping Interactions between Regimes and Protesters, edit-
ed by Frédéric, Volpi and James M. Jasper, 11–40. Amsterdam: Amsterdam university Press, 2018.
Jebnoun, Noureddine. “In the Shadow of Power: civil–Military Relations and the Tunisian Popular 
uprising.” The Journal of North African Studies 19, no. 3 (2014): 296–316. doi:10.1080/13629387. 
2014.891821.
Ketchley, Neil. “The Army and the People Are One Hand! Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian 
Revolution.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 56, no. 1 (2014): 155–186. doi:10.1017/
S0010417513000650.
THIRD WORLD QuARTERLY 15
Kuran, Timur. “The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises.” American Journal of Sociology 100, 
no. 6 (1995): 1528–1551. doi:10.1086/230671.
Kurzman, Charles. “Can understanding undermine Explanation? the Confused Experience of 
Revolution.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 no. 3 (2004a): 328–351. doi:10.1177/ 
0048393104266687.
Kurzman, Charles. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 2004b.
Lacher, Wolfram. “Families, Tribes and Cities in the Libyan Revolution.” Middle East Policy 18, no. 4 
(2011): 140–154. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00516.x.
Linz, Juan J. ‘Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration’. In The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, edited 
by Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins university Press, 1978.
Magaloni, Beatriz. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. New York: 
Cambridge university Press, 2006.
Mahoney, James. The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins university Press, 2001.
Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative 
Research.” American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (2004): 653–669. doi:10.1017/
S0003055404041401.
McQuinn, Brian. ‘History’s Warriors: The Emergence of Revolutionary Battalions in Misrata’. In The 
Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath, edited by Cole, Peter and Brian McQuinn (eds.), 229–256. 
London: Hurst Publishers, 2015.
Mekouar, Merouan. “Police Collapse in Authoritarian Regimes: Lessons from Tunisia.” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 10 (2017): 857–869. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2016.1239991.
Møller, Jørgen. “When One Might Not See the Wood for the Trees: The ‘Historical Turn’ in Democratization 
Studies, Critical Junctures, and Cross-Case Comparisons.” Democratization 20, no. 4 (2013): 
693–715. doi:10.1080/13510347.2012.659023.
Morgenbesser, Lee. Behind the Façade: Elections under Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. Albany: 
State university of New York Press, 2016.
North, DouglassC. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge 
university Press, 1990.
Pearlman, Wendy. “Contingency and Agency in a Turning Point Event: March 18, 2011, in Daraa, Syria”. 
In Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings: Mapping Interactions between Regimes and Protesters, edited 
by Volpi, Frédéric and James M. Jasper, 111–134. Amsterdam: Amsterdam university Press, 2018.
Pierson, Paul. “Big, Slow-Moving, and…Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative 
Processes”. In Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, edited by Mahoney, James and 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 177–207. New York: Cambridge university Press, 2003.
Sadiki, Larbi. “Popular uprisings and Arab Democratization.” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 32, no. 1 (2000): 71–95. doi:10.1017/S002074380002105X.
Schedler, Andreas. The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism. 
Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2013.
Schwedler, Jillian. “Routines and Ruptures in Anti-Israeli Protests in Jordan”. In Microfoundations of the 
Arab Uprisings: Mapping Interactions between Regimes and Protesters, edited by Volpi, Frédéric and 
James M. Jasper, 67–88. Amsterdam: Amsterdam university Press, 2018.
Slater, Dan. “Revolutions, Crackdowns, and Quiescence: Communal Elites and Democratic Mobilization 
in Southeast Asia.” American Journal of Sociology 115, no. 1 (2009): 203–254. doi:10.1086/597796.
Slater, Dan, and Erica Simmons. “Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics.” 
Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 7 (2010): 886–917. doi:10.1177/0010414010361343.
Soifer, Hillel David. “The Causal Logic of Critical Junctures.” Comparative Political Studies 45, no. 12 
(2012): 1572–1597. doi:10.1177/0010414012463902.
Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen. “Introduction. Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
Economies.” In Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies,edited by 
Streeck, Wolfgang and Kathleen Thelen, 1–39. New York: Oxford university Press, 2005.
Thelen, Kathleen, and James Mahoney. “A Theory of Gradual Endogenous Change.” In Explaining 
Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, edited by James Mahoney, and Kathleen 
Thelen, 1–37. New York: Cambridge university Press, 2010.
16 F. VOLPI AND J. GERSCHEWSKI
Volpi, Frédéric. “Algeria versus the Arab Spring.” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 3 (2013): 104–115. 
doi:10.1353/jod.2013.0040.
Volpi, Frédéric. Revolution and Authoritarianism in North Africa. New York: Oxford university Press, 
2017.
Walton, John K., and David Seddon. Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
